10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jack Grigg bf081835c4 Release 0.3.4
CI checks / Test on linux (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Test on macos (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Test on windows (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Clippy (1.56.0) (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Clippy (nightly) (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Code coverage (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Intra-doc links (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Rustfmt (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for macos-arm64 (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for macos-x86_64 (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for linux (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for windows (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Debian linux (push) Has been cancelled
2026-04-08 04:14:54 +01:00
Jack Grigg 9503f406ae Reject identities with unrecognised critical extensions
We don't know how to correctly use these identities. In particular, some
identities store parts of their private key material in certificate
extensions to work around hardware limitations. Not understanding these
extensions could lead to encrypting with the wrong protocol and
violating security assumptions.
2026-04-08 04:12:35 +01:00
str4d 307f5396a8 Merge pull request #124 from str4d/release-0.3.3
CI checks / Test on linux (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Test on macos (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Test on windows (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Clippy (1.56.0) (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Clippy (nightly) (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Code coverage (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Intra-doc links (push) Has been cancelled
CI checks / Rustfmt (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for macos-arm64 (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for macos-x86_64 (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for linux (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Publish for windows (push) Has been cancelled
Publish release binaries / Debian linux (push) Has been cancelled
Release 0.3.3
2023-02-11 04:37:09 +00:00
Jack Grigg cd03e7bda3 Release 0.3.3 2023-02-11 04:28:16 +00:00
str4d 54ad666c73 Merge pull request #123 from str4d/120-prevent-default-pin
Prevent changing the default PIN to itself
2023-02-11 03:00:31 +00:00
Jack Grigg d2132b4ac2 Prevent changing the default PIN to itself
Closes str4d/age-plugin-yubikey#120.
2023-02-11 02:47:55 +00:00
str4d 80e8072624 Merge pull request #117 from str4d/more-smartcard-errors
Treat `pcsc::Error::NoSmartcard` as a "YubiKey disconnected" error
2023-02-11 02:18:34 +00:00
Jack Grigg ff3e8e37c9 Treat pcsc::Error::NoSmartcard as a "YubiKey disconnected" error
Some SmartCard readers report this error when no SmartCard is inserted,
so we need to check for it when filtering for connected YubiKeys (along
with `pcsc::Error::RemovedCard` which some _other_ SmartCard readers
report instead).

Closes str4d/age-plugin-yubikey#81.
2023-01-30 00:39:08 +00:00
str4d a5178bb16e Merge pull request #118 from str4d/correctly-handle-short-pins
Enforce correct PIN lengths during YubiKey setup
2023-01-30 00:37:44 +00:00
Jack Grigg b1710e8d69 Enforce correct PIN lengths during YubiKey setup
The behaviour of `age-plugin-yubikey` during setup now matches its
behaviour during plugin usage.
2023-01-29 23:00:46 +00:00
6 changed files with 128 additions and 54 deletions
+16
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,22 @@ to 0.3.0 are beta releases.
## [Unreleased]
## [0.3.4] - 2026-04-08
### Fixed
- `age-plugin-yubikey` now completely ignores any identity that has unrecognised
critical extensions in its certificate, to ensure it doesn't misuse a newer
identity type.
## [0.3.3] - 2023-02-11
### Fixed
- When `age-plugin-yubikey` assists the user in changing their PIN from the
default PIN, it no longer tells the user that PINs shorter than 6 characters
are allowed, and instead loops until the user enters a PIN of valid length.
It also now prevents the user from setting their PIN to the default PIN, to
avoid creating a cycle.
- More kinds of SmartCard readers are ignored when they have no SmartCard
inserted.
## [0.3.2] - 2023-01-01
### Changed
- The "sharing violation" logic now also sends SIGHUP to any `yubikey-agent`
Generated
+1 -1
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "age-plugin-yubikey"
version = "0.3.2"
version = "0.3.4"
dependencies = [
"age-core",
"age-plugin",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[package]
name = "age-plugin-yubikey"
description = "YubiKey plugin for age clients"
version = "0.3.2"
version = "0.3.4"
authors = ["Jack Grigg <thestr4d@gmail.com>"]
repository = "https://github.com/str4d/age-plugin-yubikey"
readme = "README.md"
+3 -2
View File
@@ -127,13 +127,15 @@ mgr-change-default-pin =
✨ Your {-yubikey} is using the default PIN. Let's change it!
✨ We'll also set the PUK equal to the PIN.
🔐 The PIN is up to 8 numbers, letters, or symbols. Not just numbers!
🔐 The PIN can be numbers, letters, or symbols. Not just numbers!
📏 The PIN must be at least 6 and at most 8 characters in length.
❌ Your keys will be lost if the PIN and PUK are locked after 3 incorrect tries.
mgr-enter-current-puk = Enter current PUK (default is {$default_puk})
mgr-choose-new-pin = Choose a new PIN/PUK
mgr-repeat-new-pin = Repeat the PIN/PUK
mgr-pin-mismatch = PINs don't match
mgr-nope-default-pin = You entered the default PIN again. You need to change it.
mgr-changing-mgmt-key =
✨ Your {-yubikey} is using the default management key.
@@ -180,7 +182,6 @@ rec-custom-mgmt-key =
err-invalid-flag-command = Flag '{$flag}' cannot be used with '{$command}'.
err-invalid-flag-tui = Flag '{$flag}' cannot be used with the interactive interface.
err-invalid-pin-length = The PIN needs to be 1-8 characters.
err-invalid-pin-policy = Invalid PIN policy '{$policy}' (expected [{$expected}]).
err-invalid-slot = Invalid slot '{$slot}' (expected number between 1 and 20).
err-invalid-touch-policy = Invalid touch policy '{$policy}' (expected [{$expected}]).
-2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ pub enum Error {
CustomManagementKey,
InvalidFlagCommand(String, String),
InvalidFlagTui(String),
InvalidPinLength,
InvalidPinPolicy(String),
InvalidSlot(u8),
InvalidTouchPolicy(String),
@@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ impl fmt::Debug for Error {
command = command.as_str(),
)?,
Error::InvalidFlagTui(flag) => wlnfl!(f, "err-invalid-flag-tui", flag = flag.as_str())?,
Error::InvalidPinLength => wlnfl!(f, "err-invalid-pin-length")?,
Error::InvalidPinPolicy(s) => wlnfl!(
f,
"err-invalid-pin-policy",
+92 -33
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,19 @@
use age_core::{
format::{FileKey, FILE_KEY_BYTES},
primitives::{aead_decrypt, hkdf},
secrecy::ExposeSecret,
secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretString},
};
use age_plugin::{identity, Callbacks};
use bech32::{ToBase32, Variant};
use dialoguer::Password;
use log::{debug, error, warn};
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::fmt;
use std::io;
use std::iter;
use std::thread::sleep;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime};
use x509_parser::der_parser::oid::Oid;
use yubikey::{
certificate::Certificate,
piv::{decrypt_data, AlgorithmId, RetiredSlotId, SlotId},
@@ -26,13 +28,16 @@ use crate::{
fl,
format::{RecipientLine, STANZA_KEY_LABEL},
p256::{Recipient, TAG_BYTES},
util::{otp_serial_prefix, Metadata},
util::{otp_serial_prefix, Metadata, POLICY_EXTENSION_OID},
IDENTITY_PREFIX,
};
const ONE_SECOND: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1);
const FIFTEEN_SECONDS: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
/// The set of OIDs that we understand and use when parsing YubiKey slot certificates.
const KNOWN_OIDS: &[&[u64]] = &[POLICY_EXTENSION_OID];
pub(crate) fn is_connected(reader: Reader) -> bool {
filter_connected(&reader)
}
@@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ pub(crate) fn is_connected(reader: Reader) -> bool {
pub(crate) fn filter_connected(reader: &Reader) -> bool {
match reader.open() {
Err(yubikey::Error::PcscError {
inner: Some(pcsc::Error::RemovedCard),
inner: Some(pcsc::Error::NoSmartcard | pcsc::Error::RemovedCard),
}) => {
warn!(
"{}",
@@ -236,6 +241,31 @@ pub(crate) fn open(serial: Option<Serial>) -> Result<YubiKey, Error> {
Ok(yubikey)
}
fn request_pin<E>(
mut prompt: impl FnMut(Option<String>) -> io::Result<Result<SecretString, E>>,
serial: Serial,
) -> io::Result<Result<SecretString, E>> {
let mut prev_error = None;
loop {
prev_error = Some(match prompt(prev_error)? {
Ok(pin) => match pin.expose_secret().len() {
// A PIN must be between 6 and 8 characters.
6..=8 => break Ok(Ok(pin)),
// If the string is 44 bytes and starts with the YubiKey's serial
// encoded as 12-byte modhex, the user probably touched the YubiKey
// early and "typed" an OTP.
44 if pin.expose_secret().starts_with(&otp_serial_prefix(serial)) => {
fl!("plugin-err-accidental-touch")
}
// Otherwise, the PIN is either too short or too long.
0..=5 => fl!("plugin-err-pin-too-short"),
_ => fl!("plugin-err-pin-too-long"),
},
Err(e) => break Ok(Err(e)),
});
}
}
pub(crate) fn manage(yubikey: &mut YubiKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
const DEFAULT_PIN: &str = "123456";
const DEFAULT_PUK: &str = "12345678";
@@ -258,13 +288,28 @@ pub(crate) fn manage(yubikey: &mut YubiKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
let current_puk = Password::new()
.with_prompt(fl!("mgr-enter-current-puk", default_puk = DEFAULT_PUK))
.interact()?;
let new_pin = Password::new()
let new_pin = loop {
let pin = request_pin(
|prev_error| {
if let Some(err) = prev_error {
eprintln!("{}", err);
}
Password::new()
.with_prompt(fl!("mgr-choose-new-pin"))
.with_confirmation(fl!("mgr-repeat-new-pin"), fl!("mgr-pin-mismatch"))
.interact()?;
if new_pin.len() > 8 {
return Err(Error::InvalidPinLength);
.interact()
.map(|pin| Result::<_, Infallible>::Ok(SecretString::new(pin)))
},
yubikey.serial(),
)?
.unwrap();
if pin.expose_secret() == DEFAULT_PIN {
eprintln!("{}", fl!("mgr-nope-default-pin"));
} else {
break pin;
}
};
let new_pin = new_pin.expose_secret();
yubikey.change_puk(current_puk.as_bytes(), new_pin.as_bytes())?;
yubikey.change_pin(pin.as_bytes(), new_pin.as_bytes())?;
}
@@ -298,6 +343,30 @@ pub(crate) fn manage(yubikey: &mut YubiKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
/// Parses the certificate to identify the preferred recipient type it corresponds to.
pub(crate) fn identify_recipient(cert: &Certificate) -> Option<Recipient> {
let known_oids = KNOWN_OIDS
.iter()
.map(|oid| Oid::from(oid).unwrap())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
// If the certificate contains any unrecognised critical extensions, reject it: we
// don't know how to correctly use the identity. In particular, some identities store
// parts of their private key material in certificate extensions to work around
// hardware limitations. Not understanding these extensions could lead to encrypting
// with the wrong protocol and violating security assumptions.
let (_, c) = x509_parser::parse_x509_certificate(cert.as_ref()).ok()?;
if c.tbs_certificate
.extensions()
.iter()
.any(|ext| ext.critical && !known_oids.contains(&ext.oid))
{
return None;
}
Recipient::from_certificate(cert)
}
/// Returns an iterator of keys that are occupying plugin-compatible slots, along with the
/// corresponding recipient if the key is compatible with this plugin.
pub(crate) fn list_slots(
@@ -307,8 +376,7 @@ pub(crate) fn list_slots(
// We only use the retired slots.
match key.slot() {
SlotId::Retired(slot) => {
// Only P-256 keys are compatible with us.
let recipient = Recipient::from_certificate(key.certificate());
let recipient = identify_recipient(key.certificate());
Some((key, slot, recipient))
}
_ => None,
@@ -515,9 +583,9 @@ impl Stub {
let (cert, pk) = match Certificate::read(&mut yubikey, SlotId::Retired(self.slot))
.ok()
.and_then(|cert| {
Recipient::from_certificate(&cert)
.filter(|pk| pk.tag() == self.tag)
.map(|pk| (cert, pk))
identify_recipient(&cert)
.filter(|recipient| recipient.tag() == self.tag)
.map(|r| (cert, r))
}) {
Some(pk) => pk,
None => {
@@ -581,29 +649,21 @@ impl Connection {
// The policy requires a PIN, so request it.
// Note that we can't distinguish between PinPolicy::Once and PinPolicy::Always
// because this plugin is ephemeral, so we always request the PIN.
let enter_pin_msg = fl!(
let pin = match request_pin(
|prev_error| {
callbacks.request_secret(&format!(
"{}{}{}",
prev_error.as_deref().unwrap_or(""),
prev_error.as_deref().map(|_| " ").unwrap_or(""),
fl!(
"plugin-enter-pin",
yubikey_serial = self.yubikey.serial().to_string(),
);
let mut message = enter_pin_msg.clone();
let pin = loop {
message = match callbacks.request_secret(&message)? {
Ok(pin) => match pin.expose_secret().len() {
// A PIN must be between 6 and 8 characters.
6..=8 => break pin,
// If the string is 44 bytes and starts with the YubiKey's serial
// encoded as 12-byte modhex, the user probably touched the YubiKey
// early and "typed" an OTP.
44 if pin
.expose_secret()
.starts_with(&otp_serial_prefix(self.yubikey.serial())) =>
{
format!("{} {}", fl!("plugin-err-accidental-touch"), enter_pin_msg)
}
// Otherwise, the PIN is either too short or too long.
0..=5 => format!("{} {}", fl!("plugin-err-pin-too-short"), enter_pin_msg),
_ => format!("{} {}", fl!("plugin-err-pin-too-long"), enter_pin_msg),
)
))
},
self.yubikey.serial(),
)? {
Ok(pin) => pin,
Err(_) => {
return Ok(Err(identity::Error::Identity {
index: self.identity_index,
@@ -614,7 +674,6 @@ impl Connection {
}))
}
};
};
if let Err(e) = self.yubikey.verify_pin(pin.expose_secret().as_bytes()) {
return Ok(Err(identity::Error::Identity {
index: self.identity_index,