james/yubikey.rs
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Disable ensure_application_selected() by default, since it breaks PIN policy.

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This commit is contained in:
Trevor Bentley
2017-10-31 12:29:16 +01:00
parent 4eb6f1b193
commit 252226220a
5 changed files with 198 additions and 9 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
lib/tests/api.c
+126 -1
View File
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ bool prepare_rsa_signature(const unsigned char *in, unsigned int in_len, unsigne
*out_len = (unsigned int)i2d_X509_SIG(&digestInfo, &out);
return true;
}
START_TEST(test_import_key) {
ykpiv_rc res;
@@ -431,6 +432,129 @@ START_TEST(test_import_key) {
}
END_TEST
START_TEST(test_pin_policy_always) {
ykpiv_rc res;
{
unsigned char pp = YKPIV_PINPOLICY_ALWAYS;
unsigned char tp = YKPIV_TOUCHPOLICY_DEFAULT;
EVP_PKEY *private_key = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
RSA *rsa_private_key = NULL;
unsigned char e[4];
unsigned char p[128];
unsigned char q[128];
unsigned char dmp1[128];
unsigned char dmq1[128];
unsigned char iqmp[128];
int element_len = 128;
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(private_key_pem, strlen(private_key_pem));
private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(private_key);
BIO_free(bio);
rsa_private_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(private_key);
ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(rsa_private_key);
ck_assert(set_component(e, rsa_private_key->e, 3));
ck_assert(set_component(p, rsa_private_key->p, element_len));
ck_assert(set_component(q, rsa_private_key->q, element_len));
ck_assert(set_component(dmp1, rsa_private_key->dmp1, element_len));
ck_assert(set_component(dmq1, rsa_private_key->dmq1, element_len));
ck_assert(set_component(iqmp, rsa_private_key->iqmp, element_len));
// Try wrong algorithm, fail.
res = ykpiv_import_private_key(g_state,
0x9e,
YKPIV_ALGO_RSA1024,
p, element_len,
q, element_len,
dmp1, element_len,
dmq1, element_len,
iqmp, element_len,
NULL, 0,
pp, tp);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_ALGORITHM_ERROR);
// Try right algorithm
res = ykpiv_import_private_key(g_state,
0x9e,
YKPIV_ALGO_RSA2048,
p, element_len,
q, element_len,
dmp1, element_len,
dmq1, element_len,
iqmp, element_len,
NULL, 0,
pp, tp);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_OK);
EVP_PKEY_free(private_key);
}
// Verify certificate
{
BIO *bio = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
unsigned char signature[1024];
unsigned char encoded[1024];
unsigned char data[1024];
unsigned char signinput[1024];
unsigned char rand[128];
size_t sig_len = sizeof(signature);
size_t padlen = 256;
unsigned int enc_len;
unsigned int data_len;
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(certificate_pem, strlen(certificate_pem));
cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(cert);
BIO_free(bio);
pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(pub_key);
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pub_key);
ck_assert_ptr_nonnull(rsa);
ck_assert_int_gt(RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand, 128), 0);
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, rand, 128);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, data, &data_len);
prepare_rsa_signature(data, data_len, encoded, &enc_len, EVP_MD_type(md));
ck_assert_int_ne(RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(signinput, padlen, encoded, enc_len), 0);
// Sign without verify: fail
res = ykpiv_sign_data(g_state, signinput, padlen, signature, &sig_len, YKPIV_ALGO_RSA2048, 0x9e);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR);
// Sign with verify: pass
res = ykpiv_verify(g_state, "123456", NULL);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_OK);
res = ykpiv_sign_data(g_state, signinput, padlen, signature, &sig_len, YKPIV_ALGO_RSA2048, 0x9e);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_OK);
// Sign again without verify: fail
res = ykpiv_sign_data(g_state, signinput, padlen, signature, &sig_len, YKPIV_ALGO_RSA2048, 0x9e);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR);
// Sign again with verify: pass
res = ykpiv_verify(g_state, "123456", NULL);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_OK);
res = ykpiv_sign_data(g_state, signinput, padlen, signature, &sig_len, YKPIV_ALGO_RSA2048, 0x9e);
ck_assert_int_eq(res, YKPIV_OK);
ck_assert_int_eq(RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(md), data, data_len, signature, sig_len, rsa), 1);
X509_free(cert);
}
}
END_TEST
START_TEST(test_generate_key) {
ykpiv_rc res;
uint8_t *mod, *exp;
@@ -440,7 +564,7 @@ START_TEST(test_generate_key) {
res = ykpiv_util_generate_key(g_state,
YKPIV_KEY_AUTHENTICATION,
YKPIV_ALGO_RSA2048,
YKPIV_PINPOLICY_ONCE,
YKPIV_PINPOLICY_DEFAULT,
YKPIV_TOUCHPOLICY_DEFAULT,
&mod,
&mod_len,
@@ -802,6 +926,7 @@ Suite *test_suite(void) {
tcase_add_test(tc, test_list_readers);
tcase_add_test(tc, test_read_write_list_delete_cert);
tcase_add_test(tc, test_import_key);
tcase_add_test(tc, test_pin_policy_always);
tcase_add_test(tc, test_generate_key);
// Must be last: tear down and re-test with custom memory allocator
lib/util.c
+2 -3
View File
@@ -721,12 +721,11 @@ ykpiv_rc ykpiv_util_generate_key(ykpiv_state *state, uint8_t slot, uint8_t algor
if (match == 3 && major == 4 && (minor < 3 || (minor == 3 && build < 5))) {
fprintf(stderr, "On-chip RSA key generation on this YubiKey has been blocked.\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Please see https://yubi.co/ysa201701/ for details.\n");
res = YKPIV_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto Cleanup;
return YKPIV_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get device version.\n");
goto Cleanup;
return YKPIV_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
}
lib/ykpiv.c
+46 -1
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
/** @file */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -37,6 +38,40 @@
#include "internal.h"
#include "ykpiv.h"
/**
* DISABLE_PIN_CACHE - disable in-RAM cache of PIN
*
* By default, the PIN is cached in RAM when provided to \p ykpiv_verify() or
* changed with \p ykpiv_change_pin(). If the USB connection is lost between
* calls, the device will be re-authenticated on the next call using the cached
* PIN. The PIN is cleared with a call to \p ykpiv_done().
*
* The PIN cache prevents problems with long-running applications losing their
* authentication in some cases, such as when a laptop sleeps.
*
* The cache can be disabled by setting this define to 1 if it is not desired
* to store the PIN in RAM.
*
*/
#define DISABLE_PIN_CACHE 0
/**
* ENABLE_APPLICATION_RESELECT - re-select application for all public API calls
*
* If this is enabled, every public call (prefixed with \r ykpiv_) will check
* that the PIV application is currently selected, or re-select it if it is
* not.
*
* Auto re-selection allows a long-running PIV application to cooperate on
* a system that may simultaneously use the non-PIV applications of connected
* devices.
*
* This is \b DANGEROUS - with this enabled, slots with the policy
* \p YKPIV_PINPOLICY_ALWAYS will not be accessible.
*
*/
#define ENABLE_APPLICATION_RESELECTION 0
#define YKPIV_MGM_DEFAULT "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
static ykpiv_rc _cache_pin(ykpiv_state *state, const char *pin, size_t len);
@@ -228,6 +263,7 @@ ykpiv_rc _ykpiv_select_application(ykpiv_state *state) {
ykpiv_rc _ykpiv_ensure_application_selected(ykpiv_state *state) {
ykpiv_rc res = YKPIV_OK;
#if ENABLE_APPLICATION_RESELECTION
if (NULL == state) {
return YKPIV_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
@@ -242,6 +278,9 @@ ykpiv_rc _ykpiv_ensure_application_selected(ykpiv_state *state) {
}
return res;
#else
return res;
#endif
}
static ykpiv_rc _ykpiv_connect(ykpiv_state *state, uintptr_t context, uintptr_t card) {
@@ -333,7 +372,11 @@ ykpiv_rc ykpiv_connect(ykpiv_state *state, const char *wanted) {
* was supplied by an external library.
*/
if (YKPIV_OK != (ret = _ykpiv_begin_transaction(state))) return YKPIV_PCSC_ERROR;
#if ENABLE_APPLICATION_RESELECTION
ret = _ykpiv_ensure_application_selected(state);
#else
ret = _ykpiv_select_application(state);
#endif
_ykpiv_end_transaction(state);
return ret;
}
@@ -928,7 +971,7 @@ Cleanup:
}
static ykpiv_rc _cache_pin(ykpiv_state *state, const char *pin, size_t len) {
#ifdef DISABLE_PIN_CACHE
#if DISABLE_PIN_CACHE
// Some embedded applications of this library may not want to keep the PIN
// data in RAM for security reasons.
return YKPIV_OK;
@@ -976,9 +1019,11 @@ static ykpiv_rc _verify(ykpiv_state *state, const char *pin, const size_t pin_le
if ((res = _send_data(state, &apdu, data, &recv_len, &sw)) != YKPIV_OK) {
return res;
} else if (sw == SW_SUCCESS) {
if (pin && pin_len) {
// Intentionally ignore errors. If the PIN fails to save, it will only
// be a problem if a reconnect is attempted. Failure deferred until then.
_cache_pin(state, pin, pin_len);
}
if (tries) *tries = (sw & 0xf);
return YKPIV_OK;
} else if ((sw >> 8) == 0x63) {
ykcs11/tests/Makefile.am
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ endif
ykcs11_tests_LDADD = ../libykcs11.la $(OPENSSL_LIBS)
check_PROGRAMS = ykcs11_tests
TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS)
TESTS = reset.sh $(check_PROGRAMS)
if ENABLE_COV
AM_LDFLAGS += --coverage
ykcs11/tests/reset.sh
Executable
+20
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
BIN="../../tool/yubico-piv-tool${EXEEXT}"
# Verify that user has confirmed destructive hw-tests
if [ "x$YKPIV_ENV_HWTESTS_CONFIRMED" != "x1" ]; then
printf "\n***\n*** Hardware tests skipped. Run \"make hwcheck\".\n***\n\n" >&0
exit 77 # exit code 77 == skipped tests
fi
# Reset
$BIN -averify-pin -P000000 || true
$BIN -averify-pin -P000000 || true
$BIN -averify-pin -P000000 || true
$BIN -averify-pin -P000000 || true
$BIN -averify-pin -P000000 || true
$BIN -achange-puk -P000000 -N00000000 || true
$BIN -achange-puk -P000000 -N00000000 || true
$BIN -achange-puk -P000000 -N00000000 || true
$BIN -achange-puk -P000000 -N00000000 || true
$BIN -achange-puk -P000000 -N00000000 || true
$BIN -areset