james/yubikey.rs
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Minor internal cleanups

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This commit is contained in:
Jack Grigg
2019-11-21 13:14:53 +00:00
parent 7412c02892
commit d01d2dec84
1 changed files with 2 additions and 5 deletions
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src/internal.rs
+2 -5
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@@ -30,9 +30,6 @@
// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE // (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. // OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#![allow(non_upper_case_globals)]
#![allow(clippy::missing_safety_doc)]
use crate::consts::*; use crate::consts::*;
use des::{ use des::{
block_cipher_trait::{generic_array::GenericArray, BlockCipher}, block_cipher_trait::{generic_array::GenericArray, BlockCipher},
@@ -94,7 +91,7 @@ pub fn yk_des_is_weak_key(key: &[u8; DES_LEN_3DES]) -> bool {
/// %T Security for Computer Networks /// %T Security for Computer Networks
/// %I John Wiley & Sons /// %I John Wiley & Sons
/// %D 1984 /// %D 1984
const weak_keys: [[u8; DES_LEN_DES]; 16] = [ const WEAK_KEYS: [[u8; DES_LEN_DES]; 16] = [
// weak keys // weak keys
[0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01], [0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01],
[0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE], [0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE],
@@ -131,7 +128,7 @@ pub fn yk_des_is_weak_key(key: &[u8; DES_LEN_3DES]) -> bool {
// check odd parity key against table by DES key block // check odd parity key against table by DES key block
let mut rv = false; let mut rv = false;
for weak_key in weak_keys.iter() { for weak_key in WEAK_KEYS.iter() {
if weak_key == &tmp[0..DES_LEN_DES] if weak_key == &tmp[0..DES_LEN_DES]
|| weak_key == &tmp[DES_LEN_DES..2 * DES_LEN_DES] || weak_key == &tmp[DES_LEN_DES..2 * DES_LEN_DES]
|| weak_key == &tmp[2 * DES_LEN_DES..3 * DES_LEN_DES] || weak_key == &tmp[2 * DES_LEN_DES..3 * DES_LEN_DES]